



A Flexible Component based Access Control Architecture for OPeNDAP Service

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Background Themes

- Focus on two areas alluded to in the abstract:
 - 1) *“Without ready means to restrict access to data for such services, data providers and data owners are constrained from making their data more widely available.”*
 - Paradox: provision of access control can open access?!
 - illustrated by the BADC and OPeNDAP
 - But in the wider context of changing attitudes: data.gov.uk
 - 2) *“The range of different security technologies available can make interoperability between services and user client tools a challenge.”*
 - Vision of seamless access can seem remote:
 - Services too complicated, get in the way or simply broken
 - A need for flexible approach to enable support for different technologies





Inception

- Seeds planted with discussion started at this conference last year
- Solution based on the use of HTTP redirects
- OPeNDAP implementations have existing support for this*:
 1. Initiate request,
 2. server side security challenge
 3. Redirect to authentication endpoint
 4. Redirect authenticated client back to original requested URI
- NERC DataGrid Security and Python WSGI middleware
 - Security filter components arranged to give the desired access control configuration

* TDS: <http://www.unidata.ucar.edu/projects/THREDDS/tech/reference/RestrictedAccess.html>

PyDAP: <http://pydap.org/client.html>





Alternative Approaches to Authentication


- Why use redirects at all? Host service over HTTPS:
 - but then performance limitation for large datasets,
 - changes from a well known HTTP address to HTTPS – user confusion?
- HTTP Digest
 - Not secure enough
- What about SOAP?
 - An invasive approach which would change the interfaces breaking existing client tools
 - Unsuitable to large dataset transfers






Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5


- CMIP5 is a framework for co-ordinated climate change experiments
- Will input into the IPCC 5th Assessment Report (AR5) scheduled for 2013



- Software infrastructure under development:



Earth System Grid Security: Single sign on




- Users have an identity URI:
 - Identifies them and
 - an **OP (OpenID Provider)**, a service where they can be authenticated
- An **OpenID Relying Party** trusts the authentication assertion of a given OP
- SSL for mutual authenticate and enable RPs to whitelist trusted OPs

MyProxy
Credential Management Service

- OpenID less suited to non-browser based clients
- PKI based authentication - Grid based applications, OPeNDAP clients? ...


Filter Architecture



- OPeNDAP service is protected by an Authentication filter
- This redirects unauthenticated requests to an authentication service
- Authentication Service receives the client request
 - SSL client certificate based or
 - Default to OpenID based sign in

Filters in Action – ncopen client

sd OPeNDAP SSL Authentication





More About Clients

- A server-side solution but what about the client side?
 - Browser
 - WGet and Curl – replacement to legacy ftp
 - NetCDF ncopen - patch
- Demo:
 - [Browser based access](#)
 - [Command line access with wget](#)

